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4Introduction
In the field of information security, intrusion detection refers to the process of
identifying unauthorized access to computer systems or electronic data.  Several methods
exist for detecting intrusions: manual inspection of a system, audit log processing, event
log analysis, file integrity checking, host-based intrusion detection, and network intrusion
detection.  Each method has advantages and pitfalls, either in the amount of human
attention required to set up and maintain the system, the accuracy of incident detection, or
failure of the system to exclude false positives.
Intrusion detection systems differ on two axes: 1) they can be either network-
based or host-based and 2) they can use rulesets or anomaly detection to identify events.
A network intrusion detection system is either a dedicated server or network device that
examines raw network traffic.  A host-based intrusion detection system can run on a
server or workstation to watch tasks or files for signs of unauthorized activity.  For
intrusion identification, systems use rulesets, patterns for matching signatures of known
problems; anomaly detection, establishing a baseline for normal activity and flagging
deviance; or a combination of these two methods.
Log analysis usually refers to report generation for human inspection but is
sometimes used by host-based intrusion detection systems as a data source for identifying
problems.  System or event logs can be generated by almost any active software running
on a computer and in Unix/Linux are frequently managed by an application named syslog
5(Nemeth, Snyder, Seebass, & Hein, 2001).  Log message output reflects the state of the
operating system or application at a given time.  Messages vary in their level of severity,
depending on the software or application design.  For example, syslog provides 8
categories ranging from “emerg” to “debug” for differing levels of event severity.  Audit
logs differ somewhat from event logs.  Audit logs usually consist of transactions or
process call traces instead of application error or informational messages.  The data
contained in process audit logs is generally more structured than that of event logs such
as those produced by syslog.
Much research is being conducted on intrusion detection systems, especially ones
that are network-based.  In addition, many experimental systems operate on process audit
logs.  However, little attention is directed toward event log analysis for intrusion
detection.  Commercial and open source products exist that match known patterns in log
messages and alert a system administrator when a match occurs.  This method works
well, but it requires human attention and expertise.
Applying a probabilistic information retrieval model (TF-IDF term weighting and
relevance judgments) to host-based event log analysis could be an effective means of
identifying security incidents.  This paper addresses the following question: How
effective are TF-IDF weight calculations on event log messages in identifying anomalies
for intrusion detection?  If a system can be developed to accurately highlight problems
without regular pattern updates or specialist intervention, large and small IT
organizations could save significant system administrator and security analyst resources.
6Relevant Literature
Anomaly-based intrusion detection
Researchers agree on the basic goal of an intrusion detection system.  Wagner and
Soto (2002) state it thus: “The goal of an intrusion detection system (IDS) is like that of a
watchful burglar alarm: if an attacker manages to penetrate somehow our security
perimeter, the IDS should set off alarms so that a system administrator may take
appropriate action” (p. 255).  The intrusion detection system assists information security
professionals in maintaining data integrity.
Intrusion detection systems have traditionally been based on matching patterns in
raw network traffic.  More recently, however, activity has focused on profiling activity of
a system or network and detecting anomalies.  Wagner and Soto (2002) are critical of
traditional, pattern-matching intrusion detection systems.  They state that “[s]ignature-
based schemes are typically trivial to bypass simply by varying the attack slightly, much
in the same way that polymorphic viruses evade virus checkers” (Wagner & Soto, p.
255).  They contend that anomaly detection is more resistant to the evasion tactics of
attackers (Wagner & Soto).
Anomaly detecting intrusion detection systems are not without their own failings.
The current model-based approaches all share one common problem: a truly
robust intrusion detection system must solve a special case of the machine
learning problem, a classic AI problem.  That is, to prevent false alarms, the IDS
must be able to infer, from statistical data, whether the current execution of the
7system is valid or not.  The false alarm rate of present systems is a major problem
in practice. (Wagner & Dean, 2001, p. 1)
System administrators and security analysts want an IDS that requires little human
maintenance, is accurate in identifying problems, and has a low rate of false positive
generation.
Implementation techniques
Various machine learning and data-mining techniques have been used for
baselining normal system activity and identifying abnormalities.  Zanero and Savaresi
(2004) tested a two-stage anomaly detection system.  The first stage (the focus of their
research) used unsupervised learning to cluster input data, reducing the information to a
manageable size (Zanero & Savaresi).  The second stage applied statistical and machine
learning techniques on the stage-one results to identify anomalies (Zanero & Savaresi).
Zanero and Savaresi compared three unsupervised learning techniques: K-means, S.O.M.
(Self-Organizing Map), and PDDP (Participatory District Development Programme).  In
their experiments, they found that the S.O.M. algorithm performed the best for clustering
of input data (Zanero & Savaresi).
Wagner and Soto (2002) examined a system that kept track of series of system
calls.  The system operated as a finite-state automaton, and like most host-based IDS’s, it
“learn[ed] the normal behavior of applications and recognize[d] possible attacks by
looking for abnormalities” (Wagner & Soto, p. 256).  A study by Sequeira and Zaki
(2002) applied clustering algorithms to create an intrusion detection system.  Their
system achieved an 80% accuracy rate for detecting intrusions with a 15% false positive
generation rate (Sequeira & Zaki).
8The detection algorithms employed by Ye, Xu, and Emran (2000) and Liao and
Vemuri (2002) are similar to the methods explored in this paper.  Ye et al. designed and
tested a system that used Bayesian networks with undirected links between nodes to
identify anomalies in Unix process audit log data.  The system based its classification of
processes on the probability of co-occurrence of audit events in a sliding window of
events (Ye et al.).  The study concluded that the “Bayesian network has a promising
performance in intrusion detection” (Ye et al., p. 178).  While detailed information was
provided on the Bayesian network design, the conclusions were somewhat vague (Ye et
al.).  Little data was given on which types of intrusions were correctly or falsely
identified (Ye et al.).
Liao and Vemuri used term weights in their calculations.  Their experiment
treated system calls in BSM audit logs (e.g. open, close, and mmap) as terms and applied
the k-Nearest Neighbor categorization technique to identify anomalous processes (Liao &
Vemuri).  In fact, Liao and Vemuri made use of a TF-IDF weight in their categorization
system.  Their strategy differs slightly from the one used in this paper, however.  Their
method grouped audit log entries by process, not as discrete documents (Liao & Vemuri).
By focusing on a TF-IDF calculation and treating log entries as individual documents,
this paper uses a different term weight method for identifying anomalous log entries1.  In
addition, this paper introduces the use of event log messages as a data source.
                                                 
1 Specific differences between the kNN method used by Liao and Vemuri and the TF-IDF weight method
in this study will be addressed in the following section.
9Event log analysis
Unlike anomaly-based intrusion detection, the topic of log analysis has received
little research attention.  Commercial and open source tools are used for generating log
file reports (http://www.loganalysis.org), but these reports must still be examined by a
specialist.  In addition, many log analysis tools report at regular intervals, such as daily or
hourly, not in real time as do intrusion detection systems.  Muscat (2003), however,
outlines a framework for building an intrusion prevention system based on patterns
generated from processing event log data.  He suggests that examining system log entries
in conjunction with a finite state machine will yield effective patterns for a network-
based intrusion detection system (Muscat).  Muscat acknowledges the usefulness of log
message data for intrusion detection, but specific research is needed in this area.
Two log analysis tools exist that differ from the traditional pattern matching
approach, SL2 and SIDS.  SL2 presents itself as an anomaly detecting system.  The
documentation describes it thus: “This script will scan the directory where your logfiles
reside and report everything that it finds with the exception of the those expressions
found in the ignore file, scanlog.ignore” (Fulton & Hoffman).  While SL2 detects
anomalies, it still uses predefined patterns to flag messages.  This requires an expert to
configure the system with patterns.  The second log analysis tool, SIDS (Statistics-based
Intrusion Detection System), goes beyond pattern matching.  Its primary target is web
transaction logs, and it uses a simple form of thresholds to identify anomalies.  According
to a presentation by the system’s designer, though, it is prone to resource overutilization
and a large number of false positives (Russell, n.d.).
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Event log messages describe system or application state.  These messages are
written by application developers and are similar in style and in form to source code
comments.  The application of information retrieval techniques to computer source code
relates closely to event log analysis.  Ugurel, Krovetz, Giles, Pennock, Glover, and Zha
(2002) experimented with automatic classification of source code archive documents
using support vector machines.  Their system tried to assign source code files to
application categories and achieved an accuracy level as high as 86% with a relatively
low frequency of false positives (Ugurel et al.).  They included programmer comments in
their tests, which are similar to the text found in log message output (Ugurel et al.).  Both
programmer comments and log message output text are created by software developers
and tend to be concise and technically specific.  Among the conclusions of the article is
that term frequency might have improved their results (Ugurel et al.).  The system
proposed in this paper examines event log messages as documents, much as Ugurel et al.
do with source code.
Input data
For conducting intrusion detection experiments, researchers used either a
dedicated test environment or live systems to produce input data.  A test environment is
typically a localized network or group of servers that is isolated from the Internet or other
publicly accessible networks.  Data used for training an IDS simulates that which would
be generated by normal use of a computer system or group of servers.  The advantage of
using test environment input data is that one knows exactly which attacks are performed
against a test system and at what time.  Uncontrolled factors are greatly reduced.
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However, training or background network traffic and usage patterns in a test environment
can only approximate those of a real world environment.
Both the 1998 and 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluations used data
generated in a test environment.  According to Haines, Rossey, and Lippmann (2001), the
“datasets supported the evaluation, and contained extensive examples of normal and
attack traffic run on a realistic testbed network” (p. 1).  The test data was generated using
a tool developed by MIT called the Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance
Testbed.  This tool was designed to simulate multiple network hosts performing a variety
of functions (Haines et al.).
Outside of the participants of the DARPA evaluations, Ye et al., Liao and
Vemuri, and Zanero and Savaresi conducted experiments using DARPA test datasets.
Wagner and Dean and Wagner and Soto used different test environments.  Wagner and
Soto constructed a test environment that included “a fresh Linux RedHat 5.0 installation
with a version 2.2.19 kernel” (p. 261).  They simulated normal activity for wuftpd, an ftp
server application, by conducting “hundreds of large file downloads over a period of two
days” (Wagner & Soto, p. 261).
Other researchers drew test data from live systems.  This type of input data offers
the benefit of real world usage patterns, but it may contain unanticipated or unidentified
events.  Kruegal and Vigna (2003) used live web server logs from Google and two
universities in their experiments.   Maxion and Tan (2000) tested an experimental system
on both simulated usage data and on BSM audit logs from a live system.
12
Performance measurement
All quantitative performance measures focus on a system’s detection of attacks
and the generation of false positives.  According to Barbará and Jajodia’s Applications of
Data Mining in Computer Security (2002), the detection rate and false positive rate for
evaluating test systems are defined thus:
The detection rate is defined as the number of intrusion instances detected by the
system divided by the total number of intrusion instances present in the test set.
The false positive rate is defined as the total number of normal instances that were
(incorrectly) classified as intrusions divided by the total number of normal
instances. (p. 93)
To report these performance rates, researchers typically uses either generic percentages or
generate ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curves.  ROC curves are similar to
precision-recall graphs in information retrieval literature.  The graphs show, for various
internal parameter values in an experimental intrusion detection system, the false positive
rate increase as the detection rate arrives at 100%.  The percentage of false positives is
normally plotted on the x-axis with the percentage of intrusions detected on the y-axis.
Of the studies referenced in this paper that provided system performance
evaluations, Kruegal and Vigna, Liao and Vemuri, and Maxion and Tan, presented results
using ROC curves.  Sequeira and Zaki, Ye et al., and Zanero and Savaresi reported
findings in terms of percentage rates.  Wagner and Soto employed a qualitative
evaluation method.
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Applying Term Weights to Intrusion Detection
Information Retrieval meets Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection aims to identify attempts, either successful or unsuccessful, to
obtain unauthorized access to a system.  To be effective, the Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) needs to provide a high rate of successful identification with a low rate of false
positives.  If the IDS fails to identify intrusion attempts, it does not complete its task.
Additionally, if the IDS identifies too many normal events as malicious, system
administrators and security analysts waste time investigating innocuous leads.
Information (or document) retrieval systems are quite similar to intrusion
detection systems.  A typical information retrieval system takes a user query and matches
that with documents, objects, etc. within the system.  The basic goal is for the system to
produce the item(s) that the user is trying to find.  Consider the example of a Web search
engine such as Google.  When performing a search, the user types a query into a text box
and submits it to the system.  The query is generally a few words describing web pages
that the user seeks.  In response to the query, the search engine returns a ranked list of
results.  Information retrieval systems often use statistical or probabilistic methods to
determine the likelihood that a web page matches up with what the user is looking for.
The field of information retrieval employs the concept of relevance (the
germaneness of items to queries) and measures the success or performance of a system in
terms of recall and precision.  Relevance is used to describe a match between what is
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available and what a user is trying to find.  In terms of a Web search engine, this might be
finding Web sites on intrusion detection systems when typing “intrusion detection
system” into Google.  For an IDS, a highly relevant match would be the identification of
an intrusion attempt, since that is what the system is looking for.  Nonrelevant would
describe Google returning www.4greyhounds.org for the abovementioned query or an
IDS flagging legitimate user activity on a system.
Performance of a retrieval system includes measures of recall and precision.
Recall refers to the percentage of the total number of relevant documents available to the
system that is returned for a given query:
(Harman, 1997, p. 251).  A high recall value means that the system correctly identifies all
of the desired items.  Precision is the percentage of how many relevant documents are
retrieved based on a given query:
(Harman, p. 252).  A high precision measure means that few nonrelevant documents are
identified, or a low rate of false positives is attained.  In terms of recall and precision, a
Precision =
number of relevant items retrieved
total number of items retrieved
Recall =
number of relevant items retrieved
total number of relevant items
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good IDS should have a high value in both.  That would indicate that the IDS identifies
almost all unauthorized activity and produces a low number of false positives.2
Most information retrieval systems use a ranking method for generating results.
Google, for example, ranks web pages by how closely it thinks the document fits (or is
relevant to) a user’s query.  The relevance of a document is determined by how closely
the query terms match the terms in the document.  One well-known ranking method is
based on a TF-IDF (term frequency - inverse document frequency) weight (Spark Jones,
1997).  Each word or term in an information retrieval system’s knowledgebase is given a
weight based on how many documents contain that term.  When generating results, the
retrieval system uses these weights to rank the items presented to the user.
This TF-IDF calculation can also be applied to log analysis.  Each log message is
treated as a separate entity, much like Google treats web pages.  In information retrieval
terminology, each log message is a document, and the elements of the message are
document terms.  Instead of matching a search query with a list of web pages, the log
analysis tool would index a set of log messages and use the TF-IDF weighting calculation
to determine whether a new log message deviates from the norm.
The “IDF” part of TF-IDF is inverse document frequency.  The weight value of a
term is inversely related to the number of documents that contain the term.  Less
frequently occurring terms are given a higher weight.  This means that commonly
occurring log messages have a lower weight than do those with infrequently occurring
elements.  For log analysis, the result is that log messages with only frequently occurring
                                                 
2 Spam filters, which have begun using IR techniques in recent years, can also be evaluated in terms of
precision and recall.  A successful spam filter identifies almost all spam email messages (high recall) and
blocks very few legitimate messages (high precision).  In fact, some spam filters use the same statistical
and probabilistic methods described in this paper to identify unwanted email.
16
elements are given a low weight.  Messages that do not occur frequently are given a high
weight and can easily be flagged as anomalous.  Since only a human expert can make a
final determination, the weight calculations in this case represent a higher or lower
probability that the log message is anomalous.
An advantage of the TF-IDF method of log analysis is that the weight calculations
can be done very quickly.  A list of terms and corresponding IDF weights can be stored
as a hash, which generally yields fast results for searching.  The TF, or term frequency,
component merely involves counting the number of times each element occurs in an
individual log message.  Since log messages are typically quite terse, counting elements
should take few system resources beyond parsing the message itself.
Experimental System
The previous section described how information retrieval methods can be applied
to log analysis and intrusion detection.  The following is a description of the experimental
system designed for this study.
The experimental system bases identification of security incidents on event log
messages that deviate from the norm on a given server or workstation.  A two stage
process is needed for data generation.  First, a training process is required for the system
to establish a norm.  System training involves indexing log messages for a given time
period (e.g. a few days or a few weeks) and is similar to that of a search engine indexing
web pages.  After training, the system is ready for active classification of log messages.
For identifying anomalous events, the experimental system employs the TF-IDF
weight described by Sparck Jones.  This method involves keeping a count of the total
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number of documents or log messages indexed.  The IDF weight for each element or term
is calculated as log(N/n), where N is the total number of log messages and n is the
number of messages that contain the given term (Sparck Jones).  Croft and Harper (1997)
used a similar calculation, log(N-n)/n.  However, they state that for large document
collections, the difference between the two methods is negligible (Croft & Harper).
A hash table similar to an inverted document index is constructed, keeping track
of how many times each term occurs in a document.  Afterward, the IDF weight is
calculated for each term.  The hash table resembles Table 1:
Table 1: Sample Term Weight Hash Table
failed 5.734
sftp 3.781
sshd 1.278
unknown_user 8.529
user1 1.241
user2 2.003
As indicated in the previous section, less frequently occurring elements receive higher
weights.  The TF-IDF weighting assumes that terms will reoccur, so random or semi-
random strings (e.g. TCP sequence numbers in firewall log messages) require exclusion.
Once the system has established a norm, new log messages can be processed and
anomalies flagged.  The steps for log message evaluation are as follows:
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1. Parse the log message into elements with term frequency calculated.  (The
frequency is the number of occurrences of a given element in the parsed log
message.)
2. Look up each term in the table and obtain its IDF weight.  Unknown terms are
assigned an IDF value of 5% over the IDF value of the most uncommon term in
the index.
3. Calculate the TF-IDF weight for each term and a total score for the log message.
The total score for the message is the sum of the TF-IDF weights of the terms.
Log messages with a total score above a given threshold are considered anomalous and
are flagged as indicating a security incident or system failure.
The Liao and Vemuri study mentioned in the previous section employed the k-
Nearest Neighbor technique to identify anomalous processes.  The kNN method bases the
classification of a new document on its relationship to all known documents.  According
to Barbará and Jajodia (2002), the kNN “score” or weight for a given document or point
in a feature space is attained “by computing the sum of the […] distances to the k-nearest
neighbors of the point (p. 87).  The system used in this paper uses only precalculated IDF
term weights to determine the weight of a new document (log message) and to classify it
as normal or anomalous.
A notable implementation difference between the Liao and Vemuri approach and
the method used in this paper focuses on the presence of an unknown term.  The number
of unique terms in process audit logs is significantly lower than that of event logs.  Liao
and Vemuri listed a total of fifty unique system function calls found in their training data.
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Their test system classified any process with an unknown term as anomalous (Liao and
Vemuri).  Due to the limited number of available system function calls, this decision was
reasonable.  However, a Linux syslog message collection spanning only a twenty-four
hour period can have unique terms numbering in the hundreds.3  The high number of
unique terms and the frequency of new terms test data requires the use of an approximate
“anomalous” term weight.  A general classification of anomalous, the approach used by
Liao and Vemuri, would result in an unacceptably high number of false positives when
analyzing event log data.
                                                 
3 This excludes fields such as the date/time stamp that change constantly.  Including this information would
make the term count even higher.
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Methodology
Input Data
Evaluation of the test log analysis system was based on identification of intrusions
in the 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation simulated test data.  Most other
research based on the DARPA evaluation data examined the process audit logs.  Since
this study focused on analyzing syslog messages, only log output in the file dump data
was used.  The file dump data included Solaris, SunOS, and Linux syslog files, Windows
NT event logs, Apache logs, network device logs, and several other minor log file types.
To define the scope of the evaluation, only Unix and Linux syslog files were used
in the experiment.  Data for three hosts in the DARPA simulation network was available.
All of these hosts were categorized as “victim” systems, and the Simulation Network
Hosts document provided further details as shown in Table 2:
Table 2: Victim Unix and Linux Simulation Network Hosts (Simulation Network
Hosts - 1999)
IP Address Hostname Operating System
172.16.112.50 pascal.eyrie.af.mil Solaris 2.5.1
172.16.113.50 zeno.eyrie.af.mil SunOS 4.1.4
172.16.114.50 marx.eyrie.af.mil RedHat 4.2 (kermel 2.0.27)
The IP addresses for the hosts were used to identify which attacks were relevant to the
experiment (discussed in the following section).
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In addition to the syslog log files, the DARPA file dump data included logging
service configuration information.  The /etc/syslog.conf configuration file for each of the
three hosts contained directives for each log file.  Table 3 shows which log files were
used as input data for the test system.  For each log file, the configuration details indicate
the type of information present in the file.
Table 3: Log Files
Hostname Log file Syslog configuration
marx /var/log/maillog mail.*
/var/log/messages *.info;mail.none;authpriv.none
/var/log/secure authpriv.*
pascal /var/adm/messages4 *.err;kern.debug;mail.crit;user.none;user.err
/var/log/authlog auth.notice
/var/log/syslog5 auth.notice;daemon.info;mail.debug;
kern.debug;user.err;user.alert
zeno /var/adm/auth_msgs auth.emerg;auth.alert;auth.crit;auth.err;
auth.warning
/var/adm/messages *.emerg;*.alert;*.crit;*.err;kern.warning;
kern.notice;kern.info;kern.debug
/var/log/syslog mail.debug
The log files contained informational, warning, and error messages for kernel
subsystems, email applications, authentication (login), and other applications running on
the test hosts.
Training and Testing
As stated above, the input data for this study consisted of Unix and Linux syslog
messages.  This data was divided into training data and test data.  The 1999 DARPA
                                                 
4 All /var/adm/messages variants were included (e.g. /var/adm/messages.0, /var/adm/messages.1, etc.).
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Evaluation provided five weeks (Monday through Friday) of total data — three weeks of
training data and two weeks of test data.  Intrusions, or attempted intrusions, were
generated during both weeks of test data gathering, as well as during the second week of
training data.  This study used all three weeks of training data and the first week of test
data (1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Plan).
The DARPA Evaluation project supplied detailed information on the simulated
attacks (intrusions and attempted intrusions).  The information on each attack included
source and destination, the start time and duration, the type and nature of the exploit,
whether or not the attack left traces in system logs, and several other categorizations
specific to the DARPA Evaluation project.  Since this study focused on syslog data, only
attacks that were 1) directed toward the three “victim” systems listed above and 2) were
detectable from syslog data were included in the experiment.  Activity directed at
Windows NT hosts, network equipment, and Unix/Linux systems for which syslog data
was not recorded were excluded.
According to the attack labeling information, 757 total individual attacks took
place during the first week of test data generation.  Of those, 88 attacks were viewable in
syslog messages.  Finally, 38 attacks existed for the three systems examined by this study
(Detection Scoring Truth).  Performance of the test log analysis system was based on
how many log messages corresponding to these attacks were flagged as anomalous.
The test system used term weights to identify anomalies in the log file data.  Log
messages, such as those generated by firewalls and email server applications, contain
fields that change frequently.  Since the term weights are based on the frequency of
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occurrence, weights can be skewed when log files contain many unique terms.  To avoid
this problem, a list of stop patterns was used:
src[0-9]+
id[0-9]+
window[0-9]+
ttl[0-9]+
delay[0-9]+
msgid[0-9]+.*
Instead of stop words, which are common in information retrieval systems, regular
expression patterns were employed to exclude log message terms.  The DARPA log files
contained frequently changing terms such as email message id numbers and timestamps.
Performance Evaluation
Results of the test system’s ability to detect known attacks were provided as ROC
(Receiver Operating Characteristic) graphs.  The graphs show the relationship between
successful attack detection and false positive generation as the message weight threshold
was lowered.  Lowering the threshold within the system decreased the message weight at
which a log message is flagged as anomalous.  A lower threshold value within the system
increased the number of attacks correctly identified but also increased the number of false
positives.
The ROC graphs were formatted with the false positive rate on the x-axis and the
detection rate on the y-axis.  The following formulas were used to determine the
measurement rates:
False positive rate =
number of log messages outside of attack timeframe flagged as anomalous
total number of log messages analyzed
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and
In addition to the basic detection rate vs. false positive rate comparison, several
other factors were varied as part of the study.  Three different training time periods were
used.  Results with ROC graphs were generated from test system indexes of one day, one
week, and the complete three weeks of training data.  Further, the raw message weight
was compared to a weight normalized by log message term length.  The normalized
weight was calculated by dividing the raw message weight by the number of terms in the
given log message.
Detection rate =
number of log messages in attack timeframe flagged as anomalous
total number of log messages within attack periods
.
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Results
This chapter presents results from the experimental system in two areas: training
and testing.  The training section discusses characteristics of the log file indexing for the
three hosts.  The testing section covers the effectiveness of the test system’s method for
identifying anomalous events.
Training
The 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation data sets contained three weeks
of training data.  A total of fifteen days of log files were present for each of the three
simulation “victim” hosts.  The following graphs demonstrate the progression of
documents (individual log messages) indexed, the number of unique terms, and the
maximum term weight for each host’s index during system training.  The date values
along the x-axis are a combination of week and day.  They correspond to the five days in
each of the three weeks of training data.
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Figure 1: Document Count Progression
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Figure 1 shows a steady increase of total documents in the term indexes during
the training process.  The number of documents indexed was recorded at each day during
the three weeks of training data.  The graph indicates linear growth for each of the three
hosts, which means that roughly the same amount of log file data was generated each day
by the simulated hosts.  The sharp increases in the document count for the host zeno
appear to be anomalies.  Some types of intrusions cause large numbers of log messages to
be generated.  However, simulated attacks were present only during week two of the
training period, not weeks one and three.
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Figure 2: Term Count Progression
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As in Figure 1, one sees in Figure 2 a regular increase in the index term count
during the training period.  The change in term count for the host zeno in the first two
days corresponds to the event shown in Figure 1.  The climbing number of unique terms
in the index indicates potential benefits for a larger amount of training material.  A higher
percentage of indexed (already known) terms should yield better accuracy in identifying
anomalies.  In fact, results of this study show slightly better accuracy and will be
discussed in the following section.  However, the increase in unique terms shown in
Figure 1 is also partially due to inadequate stop patterns.  Some log message types
continued to generate a large number of unique terms.
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Figure 3: Term Weight Progression
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Figure 3 shows the increase in maximum weight during the training period.  The
small change in maximum weight, especially after the first week, indicates that a
reasonable threshold could be chosen sooner than at the end of the third week of training
data.  The maximum weight in the index affects the weighting of terms in test data that
are not present in training data.  Unknown terms are deemed somewhat more anomalous
than known terms and are assigned a term weight by the system.  If the system were
further trained after choosing a threshold, and the maximum weight increased
significantly, the system would produce a high number of false positives.  An increase in
the threshold would be required to correct  for this phenomenon.  The small change in
Figure 3 after the first week indicates that additional data could be indexed successfully
without having to adjust the weight threshold.  This would be useful if the host being
analyzed had not yet generated much log file data.
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Testing
The testing results section describes the effectiveness of the experimental system
in detecting intrusions using term weight based log analysis.  In addition to the term
weight and ROC graphs, several examples are given to demonstrate both correct
detection and false positive generation.  After each log message, the host, trained index
type (1 day, 1 week, or 3 weeks), the message weight type (normalized or
nonnormalized), and the message weight are listed in parentheses.
The two following log messages were correctly flagged by the test system.  They
correspond to a process table attack, a type of denial service attack, on the victim host.
This attack was detected with both raw (nonnormalized) and normalized message
weights.
Mar 31 10:31:25 zeno vmunix: proc: table is full  (zeno, 3 weeks,
normalized, 7.60843468838946)
Mar 31 10:39:58 zeno sendmail[102]: NOQUEUE: SYSERR: daemon:
cannot fork: No more processes  (zeno, 3 weeks, nonnormalized,
54.7247326476436)
The following list of  log messages contains examples of false positives.  These messages
were not generated during an attack.  However, such messages could nonetheless prove
interesting to a system administrator for other reasons.
• Log messages that were generated during a system boot sequence (While the
clock error message does not represent an attack, alerting a sysadmin to this error may aid
in correcting a non-security problem.)
Apr  2 11:20:18 zeno vmunix: WARNING: clock gained 2 days --
CHECK AND RESET THE DATE!  (zeno, 3 weeks, nonnormalized,
81.2944170548963)
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Mar 31 07:41:51 marx kernel: Linux version 2.0.30
(root@porky.redhat.com) (gcc version 2.7.2.1) #1 Tue Apr 22
10:49:45 EDT 1997  (marx, 3 weeks, nonnormalized, 102.134543685226)
• A “host not found” error for the sendmail email application, which does not
indicate a security threat
Apr  1 11:45:43 marx sendmail[1728]: LAA01726:
to=lucyj@192.168.1.10, ctladdr=bramy (2051/100), delay=00:00:00,
xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=esmtp, relay=192.168.1.10, stat=Host
unknown (Name server: 192.168.1.10: host not found)  (marx, 3 weeks,
nonnormalized, 109.953043395944)
• A kernel-level network device error message (As above, while this does not
indicate a security threat, it may represent a different type of system problem that would
require the attention of a sysadmin.)
Apr  1 06:53:12 marx kernel: eth0: bogus packet: status=0x0
nxpg=0x3a size=1082  (marx, 3 weeks, normalized, 8.74120553458676)
• An informational ntpd (a system clock synchronization application) message,
which is a clear false positive
Apr  2 11:24:43 zeno xntpd[151]: synchronized to 172.16.112.10,
stratum=5  (zeno, full, normalized, 9.71138635120919)
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To further describe the results of this study, a series of message weight graphs
(Figure 4) is provided.  These graphs depict individual message weights for the first day
of test log file data for the host marx.  One notes slight differences in message weight
distribution as the training period varies.  The difference between one day and one week
is greater than between one week and three weeks.  This supports the conclusion
suggested in the training results section that an accurate message weight threshold could
be chosen after the first week of training data.
Figure 4: Message Weight Graph Series
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Results for 3 weeks training (nonnormalized)
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Figure 5 contains ROC graphs for the three simulation hosts and compares
normalized and nonnormalized message weight methods.  These graphs show the change
in detection rate and false positive rate as the anomaly threshold was decreased.  A lower
threshold resulted in higher rates of both detection and false positive generation.
Figure 5: ROC Graph Series
Marx Results (Normalized Weights)
-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
-20.00
%
0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00
%
120.00
%
False Positive Rate
D
e
te
ct
io
n
 R
a
te
1 Day Training
1 Week Training
3 Weeks Training
Marx Results (Nonnormalized Weights)
-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
-20.00
%
0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00
%
120.00
%
False Positive (%)
D
e
te
ct
io
n
 R
a
te
1 Day Training
1 Week Training
3 Weeks Training
Pascal Results (Normalized Weights)
-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
-20.00
%
0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00
%
120.00
%
False Positive Rate
D
e
te
ct
io
n
 R
a
te
1 Day Training
1 Week Training
3 Weeks Training
Pascal Results (Nonnormalized Weights)
-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
-20.00
%
0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00
%
120.00
%
False Positive Rate
D
e
te
ct
io
n
 R
a
te
1 Day Training
1 Week Training
3 Weeks Training
33
Zeno Results (Normalized Weights)
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The test system yielded moderately successful results overall in correctly
identifying intrusions in the test data.  Like most intrusion detection systems, it
demonstrated an increase in false positives as the percentage of attack detection
increased.  As seen in the graphs, the system performed best for the host pascal.
Despite the correct identifications, the high rate of false positive generation would
make the test system almost unusable in practice.  Each host generated at minimum
several hundred log messages per day.  Even at a conservative false positive rate of 20%,
the system could still flag over 100 messages per day as possible intrusions.  A further
drawback is the narrowing in scope of this study.  To evaluate the log analysis
functionality of the test system, a significant number of attacks were excluded from the
detection rate calculation.  If these attacks had been included, the detection rate vs. false
positive rate performance would have been worse than that shown in the ROC graphs.
In addition to overall performance results, one notes the effects of changes in
weight normalization and training data.  The ROC graphs show slightly better
performance of normalized message weights and for using three weeks of training data.
Normalized message weights act as an equalizing factor between log messages of
different lengths.  Normalizing the weights prevents messages with a greater than average
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number of terms from being flagged as anomalous merely because of length.  This
focuses anomaly detection on terms rather than message length.
Tests using three weeks of training data were more successful than those using
less training data.  This finding is consistent with statistical baselining.  As the amount of
data available for establishing a baseline increases, so does the accuracy with which the
system identifies events that deviate from the norm.
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Conclusion
A term weight based log analysis is not, by itself, an effective intrusion detection
system.  The large rate of false positives and the number of intrusions not detectable from
syslog data make using log files as a sole source of data unreliable.  However, the test
system successfully detected anomalous log messages.  These messages corresponded not
only to attacks in the test data, but they also reflected other types of computer host
problems.
Applying term weights to log file data would be very useful as a generalized log
analysis tool for system administrators or as one component in a larger intrusion
detection system.  As a generalized log analysis tool, the system would report not only
potential security problems but also direct system administrators to investigate issues
such as hardware and software errors.  In addition, the system may also be effective as
part of an intrusion detection system.  Log files contain valuable information.  Combined
with other techniques and data sources, such as those described in the relevant literature
section of this paper, a successful intrusion detection system could be developed.
Avenues for Further Research
Given the results of this study, two avenues for further exploration emerge.  The
test system in this study analyzed log file data separately for each host.  In addition to
dividing the log analysis by host, further separate the statistical baseline generation by
application.  For example, better performance may be achieved by analyzing mail server
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application log messages differently from kernel subsystem messages or login messages.
Improved stop patterns would also affect test results.  The patterns used in this study were
developed to reduce the number of unique items in the term index by ignoring constantly
changing fields.  However, more effort could be focused on developing better patterns.
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Appendix A: statlog.pl Source Code
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
#------------------------------------------------------------#
#
# statlog.pl
#
# statistical log analyzer
#
# uses term weights to identify anomalous log messages
#
#------------------------------------------------------------#
use strict;
use Getopt::Long;
Getopt::Long::Configure('bundling', 'no_ignore_case');
use FindBin;
use lib $FindBin::Bin;
use indexer;
use analyzer;
# set base directory
my $basedir = $FindBin::Bin;
sub usage ($);
sub print_usage ();
sub help ();
#------------------------------------------------------------#
my(
$opt_l,$logfile,
$opt_db,$db,
$opt_analyze,$analyze,
$opt_normalize,$normalize,
$opt_train,$train,
$opt_stats,$stats,
$opt_dump,$dump,
$opt_lw,$lineweights,
$opt_t,$test,
$opt_debug,$debug,
$opt_q,$quiet
);
# read conf file arg
GetOptions (
"h|help" => \&help,
"quiet" => \$opt_q,
"debug" => \$opt_debug,
"t|test" => \$opt_t,
"train" => \$opt_train,
"analyze" => \$opt_analyze,
"normalize" => \$opt_normalize,
"stats" => \$opt_stats,
"dump" => \$opt_dump,
"lineweights" => \$opt_lw,
"db=s" => \$opt_db,
"l|logfile=s" => \$opt_l
);
# analyze option
($opt_analyze) ? ($analyze = 1) : ($analyze = 0);
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# train option
($opt_train) ? ($train = 1) : ($train = 0);
# normalize option
($opt_normalize) ? ($normalize = 1) : ($normalize = 0);
# dump option
($opt_dump) ? ($dump = 1) : ($dump = 0);
# lineweights option
($opt_lw) ? ($lineweights = 1) : ($lineweights = 0);
# stats option
($opt_stats) ? ($stats = 1) : ($stats = 0);
# mode check
if (!$analyze && !$train && !$dump && !$stats) {
&usage("Mode specification required");
}
# logfile option
if ($opt_l) {
$logfile = $opt_l;
} elsif (!$dump && !$stats) {
&usage("Logfile required");
}
# dbfile option
($opt_db) ? ($db = $opt_db) : ($db = "");
# test option
($opt_t) ? ($test = 1) : ($test = 0);
# debug option
($opt_debug) ? ($debug = 1) : ($debug = 0);
# quiet option
($opt_q) ? ($quiet = 1) : ($quiet = 0);
#------------------------------------------------------------#
if ($debug) {
print "logfile: $logfile\n";
print "db filename: $db\n";
print "analyze: $analyze\n";
print "train: $train\n";
print "dump: $dump\n";
print "lineweights: $lineweights\n";
print "quiet: $quiet\n";
print "test: $test\n";
}
my ($idxizer,$anlyzer);
if ($logfile && !$quiet) {
print "Logfile: $logfile\n";
}
if ($train) {
unless ($quiet) {
print "Training mode\n";
}
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$idxizer = new indexer;
if ($debug) {
$idxizer->Configure('DEBUG');
}
if ($quiet) {
$idxizer->Configure('QUIET');
}
if ($test) {
$idxizer->Configure('TEST');
}
if ($db) {
$idxizer->Configure("DB_FILENAME = $db");
}
if ($basedir) {
$idxizer->Configure("BASEDIR = $basedir");
}
$idxizer->build_index($logfile);
unless ($quiet) {
print "Reporting term index stats\n";
}
$idxizer->stats();
} elsif ($analyze || $dump || $stats) {
$anlyzer = new analyzer;
if ($debug) {
$anlyzer->Configure('DEBUG');
}
if ($quiet) {
$anlyzer->Configure('QUIET');
}
if ($test) {
$anlyzer->Configure('TEST');
}
if ($db) {
$anlyzer->Configure("DB_FILENAME = $db");
}
if ($basedir) {
$anlyzer->Configure("BASEDIR = $basedir");
}
if ($normalize) {
$anlyzer->Configure('NORMALIZE');
}
if ($analyze) {
unless ($quiet) {
print "Analyze mode\n";
}
if ($lineweights) {
$anlyzer->Configure('LINEWEIGHTS');
}
$anlyzer->analyze($logfile);
} elsif ($dump) {
unless ($quiet) {
print "Dumping term index\n";
}
$anlyzer->dump_index();
} else {
unless ($quiet) {
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print "Reporting term index stats\n";
}
$anlyzer->stats();
}
} else {
print "Oops, nothing to do.\n";
}
# Done.
exit;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# print usage error message, instructions, then exit
sub usage ($) {
my $msg = shift();
print "$msg\n";
&print_usage();
exit 1;
}
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# usage instructions
sub print_usage () {
print "Usage: logtool.pl\n";
print "            -l, --logfile          : input log file\n";
print "            --db                   : term database filename\n";
print "            --analyze              : invoke analyze mode\n";
print "            --train                : invoke training mode\n";
print "            --normalize            : normalize log message weights
by term count\n";
print "            --dump                 : dump contents of the term
index\n";
print "            --lineweights          : in analyze mode, display all
log lines \n";
print "                                         with weights (tab-
separated)\n";
print "            --test                 : don't really do anything\n";
print "            --debug                : lots of extra output\n";
print "            --quiet                : supress messages\n";
print "            --help                 : I need a hug\n";
}
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# help function
sub help () {
&print_usage();
exit;
}
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Appendix B: indexer.pm Source Code
#------------------------------------------------------------#
#
# indexer.pm
#
# logtool module for indexing log messages.  adds log files to the index
# of terms and regenerates the term weights
#
#
#------------------------------------------------------------#
package indexer;
$VERSION='1.0';
require 5.004;
require Exporter;
use strict;
use tokenizer;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# default config options
my %CONFIG;
$CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} = 3;
$CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"} = "term_weights.db";
$CONFIG{"DBFILE_MODE"} = "6610";
$CONFIG{"QUIET"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"DEBUG"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"BASEDIR"} = ".";
$CONFIG{"TEST"} = 0;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# function prototypes
sub build_index;
sub add_logfile;
sub terms2idx;
sub gen_weights;
sub save_weights;
sub Configure;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# xxxdoc_count term used to keep track of the number of documents
# processed for the index.  this allows recalculation of term
# weights when new log messages are added to the index.
# xxxmax_weight term is the maximum term weight value.  this is used
# to calculate a weight for terms not found in the index
# term_hash+
#    |
#    +-term-+-"<weight>:<doc_count>"
#    |
#    +-term-+-"<weight>:<doc_count>"
#    |
#    +-term-+-"<weight>:<doc_count>"
#
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
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my (%term_hash,%term_weight);
my (%stats_hash);
my $doc_count = 0;
my $max_weight = 0;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# constructor
sub new {
my $self = {};
bless $self;
return $self;
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# index building functions
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub build_index {
# input: input filename
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my ($infile) = @_;
my $err = 0;
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "build_index (logfile: $infile)\n";
}
# open the db file
dbmopen(%term_hash, $CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"}, $CONFIG{"DBFILE_MODE"}) or
die ("Error opening dbm file " .
$CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"} . "\n$!.\n");
# check for existing entries in the term_hash.  if we find a doc count,
# we're updating the index (not creating from scratch)
if (exists($term_hash{"xxxdoc_count"})) {
$doc_count = $term_hash{"xxxdoc_count"};
}
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# construct inverted document index of terms
unless ($CONFIG{"QUIET"}) {
print "Constructing inverted document index\n";
}
$self->add_logfile($infile,1);
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# calculate term weights
unless ($CONFIG{"QUIET"}) {
print "Calculating term weights\n";
}
$self->gen_weights();
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# save the term weights to the dbm file
unless ($CONFIG{"QUIET"}) {
print "Saving term weights to index dbm file\n";
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}
$self->save_weights();
# save (or update) the doc count
$term_hash{"xxxdoc_count"} = $doc_count;
# update stats hash
$stats_hash{"doc_count"} = $doc_count;
# save the max term weight value
$term_hash{"xxxmax_weight"} = $max_weight;
# update stats hash
$stats_hash{"max_weight"} = $max_weight;
# close the db file
dbmclose(%term_hash);
return($err);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub add_logfile {
# input: log file, multiplier
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my ($infile,$multiplier) = @_;
my $tokizer = new tokenizer;
$tokizer->Configure("MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH = $CONFIG{'MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH'}");
$tokizer->Configure("BASEDIR = $CONFIG{'BASEDIR'}");
$tokizer->Configure("UNIQUE");
$tokizer->init_stoppatterns;
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "add_logfile (logfile: $infile, multiplier: $multiplier)\n";
$tokizer->Configure("DEBUG");
}
if ($CONFIG{"TEST"}) {
return(0);
}
open(LOG,"<$infile") or die "Unable to open input file $infile\n";
my ($line,@tmparr);
# process the log file
while (defined($line=<LOG>)) {
@tmparr = $tokizer->tokenize_line($line);
 $self->terms2idx(\@tmparr,$multiplier);
# increment the total document count
++$doc_count;
}
close(LOG);
return(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# takes an array of terms and adds them to the inverted index
# the multiplier value allows weighting some terms more than others
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sub terms2idx {
# input: array ref, multiplier
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my ($tokens_ref,$multiplier) = @_;
# check multiplier
if (!$multiplier) {
print "terms2idx mulitiplier missing\n";
return 1;
}
my (@tokens,$token,$weight,$count);
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "terms2idx (multiplier: $multiplier)\n";
}
# add the terms to the index
foreach $token (@{$tokens_ref}) {
# found a new term
if (!exists($term_hash{$token})) {
# create term entry, set weight to 0 and count to 1
$term_hash{$token} = "0:1";
# term entry already exists, increment the doc count
} else {
# increment (with multiplier) count for term
($weight,$count) = split(/:/,$term_hash{$token});
$count = $count + (1 * $multiplier);
$term_hash{$token} = "$weight:$count";
}
}
return(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub gen_weights() {
# input: none
# output: error code
# %term_doc
# %term_weight
if ($CONFIG{"TEST"}) {
return(0);
}
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "doc_count: $doc_count\n";
}
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# get doc count for each term & compute weight
my ($term,$count,$weight,$oldweight);
foreach $term (keys(%term_hash)) {
# skip the xxxdoc_count entry
45
if ($term eq "xxxdoc_count") { next; }
# skip the xxxmax_weight entry
if ($term eq "xxxmax_weight") { next; }
# get the current information from the term_hash
($oldweight,$count) = split(/:/,$term_hash{$term});
# calculate IDF weight (Croft): log(N-n/n)
if ($count == $doc_count) {
$weight = 0;
} else {
$weight = log(($doc_count - $count)/$count);
}
# keep track of the max term weight value
($max_weight < $weight) ? ($max_weight = $weight) : ();
# save term weight and document count
$term_weight{$term} = "$weight:$count";
#print "$term: " . $term_weight{$term} . "\n";
}
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "max_weight: $max_weight\n";
}
return(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub save_weights {
# input: none
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my $term;
my $count = 0;
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "save_weights ()\n";
}
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "Saving " . (scalar(keys(%term_weight)) - 2) . " terms\n";
}
foreach $term (keys(%term_weight)) {
#print "term_weight{$term}: " . $term_weight{$term} . "\n";
$term_hash{$term} = $term_weight{$term};
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"} && ($count%500 == 0)) {
print "Saved term $count of $doc_count\n";
}
++$count;
}
# update stats hash with term count
# don't count the xxxdoc_count or xxxmax_weight terms
$stats_hash{"term_count"} = scalar(keys(%term_hash)) - 2;
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if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print $stats_hash{"term_count"} . " terms in the index\n";
}
return(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub stats {
# input: none
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
# display stats
print "doc_count: " . $stats_hash{"doc_count"} . "\n";
print "max_weight: " . $stats_hash{"max_weight"} . "\n";
print "term_count: " . $stats_hash{"term_count"} . "\n";
return(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# helper functions
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub Configure {
my $self = shift;
my (@options) = @_;
my ($option,$value);
foreach $option (@options) {
$option = lc($option);
if ($option eq "debug") {
$CONFIG{"DEBUG"} = 1;
} elsif ($option eq "quiet") {
$CONFIG{"QUIET"} = 1;
} elsif ($option eq "test") {
$CONFIG{"TEST"} = 1;
} elsif ($option =~ /^min_token_length/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} = $value;
} elsif ($option =~ /^db_filename/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"} = $value;
} elsif ($option =~ /^basedir/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"BASEDIR"} = $value;
}
}
}
1;
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Appendix C: analyzer.pm Source Code
#------------------------------------------------------------#
#
# analyzer.pm
#
# logtool module for identifying anomalous log messages
# looks up terms in the index and calculates TF-IDF weight
# for the given message
#
#
#------------------------------------------------------------#
package analyzer;
$VERSION='1.0';
require 5.004;
require Exporter;
use strict;
use tokenizer;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# default config options
my %CONFIG;
$CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} = 3;
$CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"} = "term_weights.db";
$CONFIG{"DBFILE_MODE"} = "6610";
$CONFIG{"QUIET"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"DEBUG"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"TEST"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"NORMALIZE"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"LINEWEIGHTS"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"BASEDIR"} = ".";
$CONFIG{"P"} = 0.85;
$CONFIG{"Q"} = 0.6;
$CONFIG{"THRESHOLD"} = 5.5;
$CONFIG{"UNKNOWN_TERM_WEIGHT_ADD"} = 1;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# function prototypes
sub analyze;
sub process_logfile;
sub calc_weight;
sub stats;
sub dump_index;
sub index_term_report;
sub Configure;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# xxxdoc_count term used to keep track of the number of documents
# processed for the index.  this allows recalculation of term
# weights when new log messages are added to the index.
# xxxmax_weight term is the maximum term weight value.  this is used
# to calculate a weight for terms not found in the index
# term_hash+
#    |
#    +-term-+-"<weight>:<doc_count>"
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#    |
#    +-term-+-"<weight>:<doc_count>"
#    |
#    +-term-+-"<weight>:<doc_count>"
#
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
my %term_hash;
my $max_weight = 0;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# constructor
sub new {
my $self = {};
bless $self;
return $self;
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# index building functions
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub analyze {
# input: input filename
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my ($infile) = @_;
my $err = 0;
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "analyze (logfile: $infile)\n";
}
# open the db file
dbmopen(%term_hash, $CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"}, $CONFIG{"DBFILE_MODE"}) or
die ("Error opening dbm file " .
$CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"} . "\n$!.\n");
# retrieve the maximum term weight value
if (!exists($term_hash{"xxxmax_weight"})) {
print "Oops, couldn't find xxxmax_weight dbm hash key.";
print "Unable to proceed.\n";
return 1;
} else {
$max_weight = $term_hash{"xxxmax_weight"};
}
$self->process_logfile($infile);
# close the db file
dbmclose(%term_hash);
return($err);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub process_logfile {
# input: log file
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# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my ($infile) = @_;
my $tokizer = new tokenizer;
$tokizer->Configure("MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH =
$CONFIG{'MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH'}");
$tokizer->Configure("BASEDIR = $CONFIG{'BASEDIR'}");
$tokizer->init_stoppatterns;
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "process_logfile (logfile: $infile)\n";
$tokizer->Configure("DEBUG");
}
if ($CONFIG{"TEST"}) {
return(0);
}
# threshold = log(p(1-q)/q(1-p))
#my $threshold = log(($CONFIG{"P"}*(1 - $CONFIG{"Q"})) /
($CONFIG{"Q"}*(1 - $CONFIG{"P"})));
#my $threshold = ($CONFIG{"P"}*(1 - $CONFIG{"Q"})) /
($CONFIG{"Q"}*(1 - $CONFIG{"P"}));
my $threshold = $CONFIG{'THRESHOLD'};
unless ($CONFIG{'QUIET'}) {
print "threshold: $threshold\n";
}
open(LOG,"<$infile") or die "Unable to open input file $infile\n";
my ($line,@tmparr,$lineweight);
# find statistically anomalous lines in the log file
while (defined($line=<LOG>)) {
chomp($line);
# tokenize the line
@tmparr = $tokizer->tokenize_line($line);
# calculate the TF-IDF weight for the line
 $lineweight = $self->calc_weight(\@tmparr);
# if LINEWEIGHTS is set, print: log message<tab>weight
if ($CONFIG{'LINEWEIGHTS'}) {
print "$line\t$lineweight\n";
# otherwise, compare the line weight with the
# TF-IDF threshold value
} elsif ($lineweight > $threshold) {
print "anomaly: $line (weight: $lineweight)\n";
}
}
close(LOG);
return(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# calculates the tf-idf weight for a log message
sub calc_weight {
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# input: array ref
# output: weight value
my $self = shift;
my ($tokens_ref) = @_;
if ($CONFIG{"TEST"}) {
return(0);
}
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "calc_weight (tokens_ref: arr_ref)\n";
}
my (@tokens,$token,$weight,$count);
my $msg_weight = 0;
# add the terms to the index
foreach $token (@{$tokens_ref}) {
# term not in index, assign a weight
if (!exists($term_hash{$token})) {
$weight = $max_weight +
$CONFIG{"UNKNOWN_TERM_WEIGHT_ADD"};
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "Term $token not found in index, ";
print "assigned weight: $weight\n";
}
# term exists, retrieve weight
} else {
($weight,$count) = split(/:/,$term_hash{$token});
}
$msg_weight += $weight;
}
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "calc_weight weight: $msg_weight\n";
}
if ($CONFIG{"NORMALIZE"}) {
$msg_weight = $msg_weight/($#{$tokens_ref});
}
return($msg_weight);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# run the term_index_report w/o dumping the index term
# this only reports index statistics
sub stats {
my $self = shift;
$self->term_index_report(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# run the term_index_report with dumping the index term enabled
# this displays all index terms and term weights
sub dump_index {
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my $self = shift;
$self->term_index_report(1);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub term_index_report ($) {
# input: none
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my $dump = shift;
my $term;
# open the db file
dbmopen(%term_hash, $CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"}, $CONFIG{"DBFILE_MODE"});
if ($dump) {
# dump term index contents
foreach $term (keys(%term_hash)) {
# skip the xxxdoc_count entry
if (($term eq "xxxdoc_count") ||
($term eq "xxxmax_weight"))
{ next; }
print "$term => " . $term_hash{$term} . "\n";
}
}
# display doc count & max weight at the end
print "doc_count: " . $term_hash{"xxxdoc_count"} . "\n";
print "max_weight: " . $term_hash{"xxxmax_weight"} . "\n";
# get the term count (don't include xxxdoc_count & xxxmax_weight)
my $term_count = scalar(keys(%term_hash)) - 2;
print "term_count: $term_count\n";
# close the db file
dbmclose(%term_hash);
return(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# helper functions
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub Configure {
my $self = shift;
my (@options) = @_;
my ($option,$value);
foreach $option (@options) {
$option = lc($option);
if ($option eq "debug") {
$CONFIG{"DEBUG"} = 1;
} elsif ($option eq "quiet") {
$CONFIG{"QUIET"} = 1;
} elsif ($option eq "test") {
$CONFIG{"TEST"} = 1;
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} elsif ($option eq "lineweights") {
$CONFIG{"LINEWEIGHTS"} = 1;
} elsif ($option eq "normalize") {
$CONFIG{"NORMALIZE"} = 1;
} elsif ($option =~ /^min_token_length/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} = $value;
} elsif ($option =~ /^db_filename/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"} = $value;
} elsif ($option =~ /^basedir/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"BASEDIR"} = $value;
}
}
}
1;
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Appendix D: tokenizer.pm Source Code
#------------------------------------------------------------#
#
# tokenizer.pm
#
# logtool module for tokenizing strings (e.g. log messages) and
# returning an array of tokens (terms)
# Includes decision-making components such as discarding terms
# under a given length and employing stop patterns
#
#------------------------------------------------------------#
package tokenizer;
$VERSION='1.0';
require 5.004;
require Exporter;
use strict;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# default config options
my %CONFIG;
$CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} = 4; # minimum length of a valid term
$CONFIG{"UNIQUE"} = 1; # return only unique terms?
$CONFIG{"QUIET"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"DEBUG"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"TEST"} = 0;
$CONFIG{"BASEDIR"} = ".";
$CONFIG{"STOPPATTERN_FILE"} = "stop_patterns.conf";
my %stophash;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# function prototypes
sub init_stoppatterns;
sub tokenize_line;
sub make_unique;
sub get_stoppatterns;
sub stoppattern_match;
sub Configure;
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# constructor
sub new {
my $self = {};
bless $self;
return $self;
}
#------------------------------------------------------------#
# initialize the stop patterns list
sub init_stoppatterns {
my $self = shift();
# import list of stop words
$self->get_stoppatterns;
}
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#------------------------------------------------------------#
# converts a unix syslog file line into an array of terms
# - ignore white space
# - convert to lower case
# - weed out duplicate terms
# - skip 'xxxdoc_count' & 'xxxmax_weight' if it happens to
# exist in a log file line this shouldn't happen,
# but it's here just in case
# - ignore stop words
# - remove non-word characters from terms
sub tokenize_line {
my $self = shift();
my ($line) = @_; chomp($line);
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH: " . $CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} . "\n";
}
my (@tokens,$token);
my @term_array = ();
# convert format (drop pid numbers)
# <daemon>[<pid>]:
$line =~ s/://g;
$line =~ s/\[[0-9]+\]//g;
@tokens = split(/\s+/,$line);
# get rid of month, day, time
splice(@tokens,0,3);
foreach $token (@tokens) {
# xxxdoc_count and xxxmax_weight are reserved.
# they shouldn't appear but check just in case
if (($token eq "xxxdoc_count") ||
($token eq "xxxdoc_count")) { next; }
# remove non-word characters
$token =~ s/\W//g;
# skip words under $CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} characters long
if (length($token) < $CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"}) {
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "Skipping token $token, too short ";
print length($token) . " < " .
$CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} . "\n";
}
next;
}
# lower case
$token = lc($token);
# skip stop patterns
if ($self->stoppattern_match($token)) { next; }
# finally, add the approved term to the term_array
unshift(@term_array,$token);
}
if ($CONFIG{"UNIQUE"}) {
# we don't want terms in the same log line to be counted twice, so
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#       let's keep track of the terms we've seen for this line
$self->make_unique(\@term_array);
}
return(@term_array);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# takes an array and removes the duplicate entries
sub make_unique {
# input: array reference
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my ($arr_ref) = @_;
my ($term,%unique_terms);
# go through each term in the array, removing the elements
# as we proceed
while ($term = shift(@{$arr_ref})) {
# skip duplicate terms
if (exists($unique_terms{$term})) {
#print "Duplicate term skipped: $term\n";
next;
# add new ones to the hash table
} else {
$unique_terms{$term} = 1;
}
}
# put the unique terms back into the array
@{$arr_ref} = keys(%unique_terms);
return(0);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# helper functions
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# matches the term to patterns contained in the stop_words.txt file
# returns 1 if a stop word is matched, 0 otherwise
sub stoppattern_match {
# input: term
# output: error code
my $self = shift;
my ($term) = @_;
my $key;
my $retr = 0;
foreach $key (keys(%stophash)) {
if ($term =~ /^$key$/) {
$retr = 1;
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "Matched stop pattern $key in $term\n";
}
last;
}
}
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return($retr);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
# retrieves the list of patterns from the stop patterns config file
sub get_stoppatterns {
my $self = shift;
my $line;
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "Building stop words list\n";
}
my $stoppatterns = $CONFIG{"BASEDIR"} . "/" .
$CONFIG{"STOPPATTERN_FILE"};
open(INFILE,"<$stoppatterns") or die
"Unable to open input file: $stoppatterns\n";
while (defined($line = <INFILE>)) {
chomp($line);
$line = lc($line);
$stophash{$line} = 1;
if ($CONFIG{"DEBUG"}) {
print "Set stop word: $line\n";
}
}
close(INFILE);
}
#----------------------------------------------------------------------#
sub Configure {
my $self = shift;
my (@options) = @_;
my ($option,$value);
foreach $option (@options) {
$option = lc($option);
if ($option eq "debug") {
$CONFIG{"DEBUG"} = 1;
} elsif ($option eq "quiet") {
$CONFIG{"QUIET"} = 1;
} elsif ($option eq "test") {
$CONFIG{"TEST"} = 1;
} elsif ($option =~ /^min_token_length/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH"} = $value;
} elsif ($option =~ /^db_filename/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"DB_FILENAME"} = $value;
} elsif ($option =~ /^basedir/) {
($option,$value) = split(/\s*=\s*/,$option);
$CONFIG{"BASEDIR"} = $value;
} elsif ($option eq "unique") {
$CONFIG{"UNIQUE"} = 1;
}
}
}
1;
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